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The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the market behavior during the 
pre-open period, a non-trade period, i.e. price discovery, cost of information 
disclosure and liquidity. 
This dissertation constructs a Bayesian game model with the pre-play 
communication system: information disclosure and market participation model by 
taking into account the characteristics of sending, revising and recalling order during 
the pre-open period. In the model, this dissertation also considers information 
asymmetry, endowment shock of insiders, and participation cost of outsiders. By 
utilizing the revelation principle, the equilibrium result is derived. The following 
conclusions are found: 
First, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium price is 
positively related to the belief of outside investors. 
Second, under single game, the insiders would not disclose the private 
information about asset value and the endowment shock. Under repeated game, the 
insiders would disclose the private information about the asset value and the 
endowment shock when probability of information disclosure is higher than the 
critical value, which is directly related to constant absolute risk aversion coefficient of 
insiders and standard deviation of asset distribution.  
Third, when market participation cost is high, the pre-open period would 
promote liquidity and social welfare. When the market is equilibrium, the risk-averse 
insiders communicate with each other about the private information on liquidity and 
asset value. This would economize the market participation cost and reduce the 
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第一章  绪论 




















                                                        
























Biais, Spatt and Hillion(1999)在一个集中市场上（Paris Bourse），研究了价格试探
过程（the pre-opening tatonnemment process）对价格发现过程的重要性。Lescourret 









1.2  命题的提出 
价格发现、信息披露成本是金融市场微观结构理论中信息模型研究的核心问
题。由于存货模型对市场价格行为的解释能力有限，自 20 世纪 80 年代开始，对
市场微观结构的研究转向了以非对称信息为基本解释工具的信息模型的研究。信
息模型也是近 20 多年来市场微观结构理论中发展 快的理论。 
信息模型起源于 Bagehot(1971)发表的《The only game in town》一文，也是
早研究信息如何反映到证券价格中的文献。Copeland and Galai(1983)首次正式
使用“信息成本”这一概念，认为只要有信息成本就足以导致价差的存在。Glosten 
and Milgrom(1985)克服了 Copeland and Galai 模型单期静态的缺陷，首次在信息
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